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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether an institutional reform such as decentralisation results in 
improved quality of government (better service delivery and less corruption) to the final users 
–the citizens and at what expense? 
 
 In the context of developing states, evidence suggests that decentralisation not only results in 
aggravating both regional disparities and the capture of local government by local elites. 
 
An apt case study is that of Pakistan, where both conditions are present; decentralisation of 
government took place and the presence of local elites capturing local governments within the 
smaller cities of the provinces. It recreates the conditions of a ‗natural experiment‘ since 
decentralisation was introduced in 2000 and rolled back after a decade. Also, we can compare 
the effects of different compositions of local elites over service delivery, i.e. are they able to 
capture government to their own benefit? Or on the contrary is government closer to the 
citizens?  
 
This is a comparative study focusing on two similar cities known for their elite capture: 
Multan and Larkana. The quality of government is to be measured through the service 
delivery of education, health care and law enforcement. The results from the empirical data 
shows an interactive effect between decentralisation and the structure of the local elite: the 
result is multifaceted: increased regional disparities, increased quality of services, and 
contrary to theory –increased corruption. Where the local elite is made up of more than one 
clan, there ensues competition effectively delivering an improvement of services. Whereas, in 
a monopoly situation the overall effect of decentralisation results in stronger capture of local 
governments. 
 
Overall, in Multan, the three services have improved. However the citizens‘ perception also 
highlights an increase in corruption. The structure of the local elite in Multan is such that 
Multan has a number of local elites that are at ―loggerheads‖. This is evidenced by the number 
of families as well as the division of its members of National Assembly within the city. It is 
the stronghold of the present Prime Minister Gilani.  
 
Larkana on the other hand has suffered in all three sectors. Education – a lot of ―ghost 
schools‖ overshadow an efficient education system preventing children from going to school; 
healthcare has not reached the final users as was planned; and the law enforcement has not 
shown signs of improvement it was meant to, while corruption has become rampant. The city 
of Larkana is the stronghold of a single clan - the Bhutto family.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 
Throughout history policy makers have experimented with governance systems in search for 
better Quality of Government. Decentralisation evolved as the solution to the failure of the 
centralist state. Decentralisation takes place when the central government transfers powers to 
actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy 
(Ribot 2002).  As such, it gives lower levels of government greater authority in delivering 
services. Decentralisation ultimately involves a shift of power and resources away from 
central government, the three main types differentiated between are fiscal, political and 
administrative (Weitz, 2010).   
 
Recently, decentralisation has been promoted in policy circles both as a means of improving 
service delivery as well as a tool for combating corruption. Several developing countries, 
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Pakistan, among others, have undertaken 
significant steps towards shifting powers to sub-national tiers of government. (Aspinall and 
Berger 2001,  Ma 1996, Rodriguez, 1997 Ward and Rodriguez, 1999). The main arguments 
forwarded are that devolving power would result in an increase in the quality of services due 
to the local information base in response to local demands, i.e. supply will respond to demand. 
Furthermore, devolving power to local governments would create more accountability as local 
governments would be more, accessible and able to be scrutinized by the citizens as final 
service users, effectively using decentralisation as a tool to combat corruption.  
 
However, the debate within the Quality of Government (QoG) literature remains divided, 
there is evidence that both supports and contradicts these hypothesized effects. In the context 
of developing countries can an institutional reform (decentralistaion) lead to an increase in the 
quality of services (efficiency, efficacy, or economy; or the three of them) at the local level? 
Is it an effective tool to combat corruption or is there a trade-off? How does the local power 
structure affect the process, if at all? Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? 
  
This thesis intends to answer the above posed questions through a comparative case study of 
two cities within Pakistan. Both cities – Multan (Punjab) and Larkana (Sind) – have similar 
preconditions and were part of the nationwide decentralisation process that was implemented 
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by the Musharraf government in 2001. The institutional reform yielded extremely different 
results as regards the quality of government in these similar cities. Multan saw an increase in 
the quality of services, specifically within its healthcare and educational services, alongside 
an increase in corruption. Whereas, Larkana on the other hand, witnessed increased corruption 
with next to no improvement in the quality of services, evidenced through the spread of 
―ghost schools‖ and unattended Basic Health Units –which were part of the same sub-national 
government schemes implemented in both cities. Decentralisation may lead to increased 
corruption in developing countries but not necessarily at the expense of efficiency, the present 
case is illustrative of situations where there is a trade-off, as in the case of Multan where 
services improved and corruption increased, and on the other end of the spectrum, it can lead 
to detrimental situations as has been the case for Larkana. A comparative study of the two 
cities can help understand the possible mechanisms that resulted in the contrast between the 
two cities. 
 
The contributions of my research are twofold. It is a contribution of a descriptive nature to the 
literature on decentralization and quality of government (QoG): it shows that there is more 
than one variable of good governance, i.e. the characteristics that we tend to associate to good 
governance or quality of government do not necessarily go hand in hand. In the literature less 
corruption is normally associated with high QoG. (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2008) 
However, it appears that an institutional reform such as decentralisation, which is 
hypothesized to improve quality of government (consisting of the two variables; quality of 
services and reduction in corruption), instead leads to an increase one aspect of QoG (quality 
of services) at the expense of another (i.e.) increase in overall corruption.  The study shows 
that there can exist a trade-off within the desired effects of the institutional reform: 
decentralisation may in fact lead to an increase in the quality of services, simultaneously as an 
increase in corruption, as in the case of Multan. On the other hand the decentralisation effort 
can result in the increase of corruption without any improvement in QoG, instead 
deterioration, as the case of Larkana shows. The underlying reason is the type of local elite 
structure that exists; if there is a situation of competition between the local elite that has 
captured the local government, then there will be a ―trade-off‖ whereas a monopoly situation 
will result in capture to increase without the positive outcome that decentralisation is 
predicted to bring about.  
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Furthermore, as indicated by Bardhan the data below provincial level is often scarce, therefore 
this study will add to this existing gap in the literature as well as add empirical data to the 
studies of local capture of local governments.  
Data sources include interviews with service providers within the three services; Healthcare, 
Education and law enforcement, government officials, NGOs working directly in both cities.  
The thesis is structured as follows: First the literature will be reviewed, Second research 
methodology, Third, the process of Decentralisation in Pakistan, Fourth; analysis and 
discussion of findings to answer main questions of thesis. Last section concludes and gives 
recommendations.  
 
2.  Decentralisation 
 
2.1 What is it? 
 
In the last two decades one of the mantras within the governance realm has been 
decentralization. The decentralization wave has swept across the globe, ranging from the 
empowerment of the regions with the European Union, to that of developing nations‘   
adaptation as part of policy experiments meted out by the World Bank, as evidenced by the 
Bank‘s embracing it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda (see for example, 
World Bank, 2000; Burki, Perry and Dillinger, 1999).
1
  
 
 As pointed out by Bardhan ―different people mean different things by decentralization.‖2 The 
core idea of decentralisation was presented by Tiebot within the fiscal federalism literature. 
However, for the purposes of this study, the definition provided by Ribot (2002) will be 
utilized: “decentralisation takes place when central government transfers powers to actors 
and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy” 
 
                                                 
1
 Shah and Schuter (YEAR) 
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The goal of decentralization is to bring government closer to the people, effectively increasing 
the accountability mechanisms. When there is local government, the local inhabitant will be 
able to demand results of the tax he is paying. The ultimate goal of decentralization is to 
improve service delivery in response to the ultimate user, i.e. the citizen. To sum up, as 
pointed out by Rodrigues-Pose ―the recent wave of decentralization has, according to the 
‗new regionalist‘ literature in political science, tended to be justified on the grounds of a 
supposed greater capacity of subnational governments to overcome the failures of the 
centralized state (Bardhan,2002, 185), to deliver improved economic efficiency (Keating, 
1998; Morgan, 2002)‖  
 
2.2 To devolve or not to devolve? 
 
There is a growing empirical literature on the association between institutions –for example, 
the structure of government and political regimes -and the quality of government. (De Mello 
2010). Regarding links between decentralisation and quality of government Fjeldstad‘s (2004) 
literature review shows a clear division between scholars on this matter; on the one hand there 
are those that argue in favour of decentralisation, on the other, those that argue against. On the 
one hand, a range of potential benefits are forwarded in support of decentralisation, such as; it 
reduces the role of the state, by fragmenting central authority and introducing more 
intergovernmental competition and checks and balances, in turn creating more accountability. 
However, Rose-Ackerman (year) cautions that fragmentation of political power is not 
necessarily effective; pointing out that under some conditions, a system of multiple veto 
points is particularly subject to improper influence and a federal system may simply give state 
and local political leaders leeway to enrich themselves at public expense.  
 
Furthermore, one main argument forwarded in favour of decentralisation is that of efficiency 
–that decentralisation improves service delivery; supply will respond to the actual demand as 
local service provision would have the local information base hence be better at provision 
than the central state (e.g. Fisman and Gatti 2002, Huther and Shah 1998, and Adsera et al 
2003). Decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and 
ensuring local cultural and political autonomy. (Bardhan 2002) 
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On the other hand are those that argue that decentralisation leads to more corruption. 
(Treisman 2000, Tanzi 2004, Gerring and Thacker 2004, and Prud'homme 1995). They argue 
that decentralisation reduces accountability because of the multiple layers of government that 
come into existence, blurring the divisions between the different tiers and making it difficult 
for the citizens to direct their complaints or credit in regard to services delivered. Here the 
centralized state is able to offer more monitoring of the system.  
 
 
2.3 Decentralisation in developing countries 
 
In order to better understand the nuances of decentralisation and its effects, latest research has 
focused on the settings in which decentralisation takes place, i.e. developing countries versus 
developed ones.  
 
Decentralisation in high income countries has, if anything, been linked with a reduction of 
regional inequality. In low and medium income countries, fiscal decentralisation has been 
associated with a significant rise in regional disparities, which the positive effects of political 
decentralisation have been unable to compensate. Policy preferences by subnational 
governments for expenditure in economic affairs, education, and social protection have 
contributed to this trend. Whether the global transfer of authority and resources to subnational 
tiers of government may yield different results in terms of territorial equity in the developed 
and the less developed worlds and across countries which have diverse histories and levels of 
decentralisation and which have adopted different paths towards it. On the whole, the positive 
and negative effects of fiscal and political decentralisation may offset one another, capacity 
and financial resource constraints and weaker endowments in the poorer regions of lower 
income countries may exacerbate the negative impact of decentralisation on territorial 
inequality. Less developed countries with already existing high territorial imbalances will, as 
a consequence, tend to exhibit growing inequalities once they decentralise, while the effect of 
decentralisation in the developed world may be either neutral or even contribute to a reduction 
of regional disparities. (Rodriguez-Pose, 2010) 
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Challenges 
An important issue pointed out by Bardhan (2002) is the different type of challenges resulting 
from decentralisation in the developing world when compared to the developed. In terms of 
developing and transition countries, an essential fact to keep in mind is that decentralisation 
poses different issues in the institutional context than those faced by developed countries, 
hence the danger posed when trying to draw lessons for them from, say, the experiences of 
U.S. states and city governments. Likewise, Bardhan (2002) focuses on decentralised delivery 
of public services in the specific context of developing nations, warning of the danger of local 
elite capture being alarmingly present.  
 
The issues that may arise in the institutional context during the decentralisation process in 
developing states, include voting –which does not necessarily act as a representational tool. 
Furthermore, a pertinent issue present in developing states is that of local elites whose 
stronghold can be strengthened through the introduction of local governments and therefore 
may inhibit the desired outcome of decentralisation.  
 
 
2.4 Voting not a representational tool 
 
The basis on which decentralisation has been justified in developed countries include people 
mobility – ―voting with your feet‖ – showing the citizens preferences for goods and services. 
This issue is highly relevant in the context of developing states because in most developing 
countries, the problem is not to reveal the fine differences in preferences between jurisdictions 
but to satisfy basic needs, which are—at least in principle—quite well known. The 
assumption is that the taxpayers/voters of each jurisdiction will express their preferences in 
their votes. This hypothesis bears little relationship to local electoral behavior present in 
developing countries. Local elections, when they exist, are usually decided on the basis of 
personal, tribal, or political party loyalties. People vote for a mayor they know, a member of 
their group, or someone they relate to having power, which could be exercised if needed, 
including solving your problem e.g. going to court regarding a property matter. (Prud‘homme, 
1995) Therefore voting may not be an ample tool to represent the preferences of the local 
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population as is assumed by the above mentioned model.  
 
 
2.5 Local elites 
 
Another challenge resulting from decentralisation, in the context of developing states, is that it 
may facilitate capture
3
 of local governments by interest groups (Bardhan andMookherjee, 
2000; Prud'homme, 1995, Tanzi, 1998). Through devolution the local politician has more 
autonomy and has more freedom to act as he pleases in the absence of power sharing with the 
central government. (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). This builds on the Madisonian view, as 
expressed in the Federalist Papers –the lower the level of government, the greater is the 
extent of capture by vested interests, and the less protected minorities and the poor tend to be.  
Such a situation would further enhance local elites‘ capture of local government, an area 
researched within the World Bank's research unit by Anwar Shah, as well as by Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2002).  The situation can arise even in the relatively few democratic developing 
countries, where the institutions of local democracy and mechanisms of political 
accountability are often weak. Thus, any discussion of delivery of public services has to 
grapple with issues of capture of government at different tiers by elite groups more seriously 
than is the custom in the traditional decentralization literature. (Bardhan, 2002;192).  
 
The character of local elites can vary from country to country. In Colombia the local elite 
consists of a handful of families that take turns in sharing power, where a quota system has 
evolved, wherein each family takes its turn in running the political scene.  
 
Furthermore, Anirudh Krishna delves into the local elites of North India, tracing how the local 
elite structure has evolved through the access to information, where previously the old ‗wise‘ 
men retained power through their monopoly of access to knowledge, the ‗naya netas‘ (literally 
new politician) has taken over the local power base through their access to knowledge of the 
                                                 
3
 (Shah, 2005) State capture: Collusion by private actors with public officials or politicians for their mutual, 
private benefit is referred to as state capture. That is, the private sector ―captures‖ the state legislative, executive, 
and judicial apparatus for its own purposes. State capture coexists with the conventional (and opposite) view of 
corruption, in which public officials extort or otherwise exploit the private sector for private ends. 
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outside world and their willingness to share this with the locals.
4
  The naya netas are more 
educated and accessible to the local population and their openness and know-how is what 
keeps them in power because the citizen is able to turn to them with all matters of concern, at 
any given time. The monopoly of the ‗old wise men‘ has broken and shifted to those more 
willing to share information (of all kinds.) (Krishna 2007) 
 
A third type of local elite is that found in Pakistan; where the local elite, consisting of the 
landed gentry, continues to retain its power; through its monetary power coupled with their 
access topnotch education that places them in positions where they have access to information 
and worldly knowledge –dominating the political realms of society. According to Gilmartin 
(1988) and Ansari (1979) these local elites can transcend local to national levels. An added 
factor that has been absent previously in this conjunction, is the power these elites exercise 
through their religious positions of sajjadia and gaddi nashins (literally in prayer, and seat 
holders), an elevated position of sainthood status that has created a situation where they are 
treated as demi-gods.  
 
2.6 Structure of local elite 
 
The power base of these families as it exists has resulted in decentralization increasing their 
capture of local government. In their paper exploring decentralisation and its impact on local 
politicians' accountability, Keefer et al (2005) touch upon the power structure at local levels 
in Pakistan, and how local capture of governments by local elite can be aggravated. They 
focus on the importance of the power structure. 
“First, anecdotal evidence (e.g., Gazdar 2000) suggests that special interests, whether they be 
landowners or family or clan lines (zaats), appear to be no more cohesive at the local than 
national levels. In some rural areas, a single family or landowner is dominant; in those 
circumstances, decentralization will increase special interest cohesiveness and reduce public 
sector performance. In most areas, however, there are multiple clans and landowners who 
are often at loggerheads and do not form political alliances; special interests are therefore 
                                                 
4
 Kitschelt, Herbert; and Wilkinson, Steven I.. Patrons, Clients and Policies. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Cambridge Books Online. Cambridge University Press. 08 August 
2011 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511585869.006 
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likely to be divided rather than cohesive in both national and local elections.” 
 
The article suggests that in the situation where there is a single family constituting the local 
elite; decentralisation would heighten the capture of the local government, effectively 
impeding the goals of improving QoG. Whereas, if the local elite structure is made up of more 
than one family, a situation of competition ensues, in which case decentralisation would still 
be able to achieve its goal as set out. This paper theoretically builds upon this proposition and 
empirically aims to test it. 
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
 
The methodological approach of this research is of a qualitative nature. It is a comparative 
case study of the cities of Multan and Larkana, in Pakistan. Case studies are essential for 
description, and are, therefore fundamental to social science. (King, 1994). Comparative case 
studies can yield valid causal inferences when, as elaborated by Alexander George, a method 
of ―structured, focused comparison‖ is used, emphasis on the way data is collected. 
 
After carrying out a literature review, I studied the primary sources Local Government Book 
in combination with the Local Government Ordinance of 2001, the legal basis for the 
implementation of the Local Government System. That was followed by closely studying 
further secondary sources that explored the local government system of Pakistan and its 
impacts together with the current situation. Preliminary research was carried out to map out 
the different impacts experienced by the cities of Multan and Larkana. In order to further 
understand and substantiate the impact of the local government system on the end users, field 
research was carried out.  
 
The field research was undertaken in the cities of Karachi, Islamabad and Multan, where I 
conducted interviews and collected data mainly from the non-governmental organisations; 
Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE) and Transparency International 
Pakistan (TI). I extensively studied the surveys carried out by the DTCE which mapped the 
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progress of the local government system, of which three separate social audits were carried 
out, 2001/2002, 2004/05 and 2010.  
  
I conducted a total of seventeen interviews during the months of March, April and May 2011. 
All interviews were conducted in Urdu by myself. Eleven of these were semi-structured 
interviews with providers and observers of the three services of education, health care and law 
enforcement. Semi-structured interviews were opted for in situations where it was unlikely to 
meet with the interviewee more than once. Six informal interviews were carried out with 
government officials involved in the implementation of the local government plan, the Chief 
consultant and the chairman of the National Reconstruction Bureau and members of the 
Rotary Club Karachi, as well as the chairman of the TI Pakistan chapter. This type of 
interview was carried out where I had had more than one meeting with the interviewee. 
  
One of the main limitations I faced was not being able to travel to Larkana for conducting 
interviews with the local service providers. This was acted upon as per the advice of former 
secretary of Sindh, specifying primarily security concerns for females within the area. 
Therefore, in order to get interviews relating to the services of education, healthcare and law 
enforcement in Larkana, these were carried out with officials that have been active in the city 
as part of service provision as well as NGO members that have been directly involved in the 
educational, healthcare and law enforcement sectors of the city.   
 
The main aims studied through empirical research were the following; 
 To investigate the theory that decentralisation increases regional disparities in developing 
nations and is positively linked to improvements in QoG, that is how end users perceive 
the local governments‘ role in improving the quality of government – in this case local 
service provision.  
 To understand the varying effect of decentralisation on QoG depending on the structure of 
the local elite‘s coupled with their dual political and religious roles. Seeing to what extent 
the structure of the local elite affects the results of decentralisation. 
  
Local experts from the three sectors of education, healthcare and law enforcement were 
interviewed – including teachers, principals, doctors, hospital management, as well as former 
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and present mayors. These sectors were investigated as they are an established measure 
looked upon within the literature on decentralisation and quality of government. Criticism 
raised against the use of these, by a Red Cross researcher, was that they are considered as 
Western measures that are not applicable to the local situation present on ground in a 
developing country like Pakistan. The reason for the sample selection of the local experts is 
that these are the people that can give an insight into the workings of the local governance and 
also because perceptions play a significant role in the assessment of quality of government. 
 
The interview guide utilized was largely based on that of the Quality of Government 
Institute's EU Commission Report regarding ―Sub-national variation of QoG in the EU.‖ The 
guide was chosen due to its relevance in utilizing local experts from within these services and 
its focus on sub-national variation. (Berard 1995: 212).
5
  
 
 
4.  Decentralisation in Pakistan– through the ages 
 
  
Local government is no stranger to Pakistan. It has been present at village level before the 
partition of the Indian Subcontinent, in the form of the local panchayat (literally council of 
five), which performed administrative, judicial and sometimes developmental functions 
(Majumdar 1960, Basham 1954).
6
 However, deliberate decentralisation, implemented by the 
government as part of its governance strategy, occurred three times in Pakistan‘s history. Each 
time carried out by military governments; more willing to create a bottom-up system in order 
to sustain the top-down regimes that they ran; Generals Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq and the latest 
local government system as implemented by Musharaf. (Cheema et al, 2005). Each 
decentralisation attempt will be looked at below.  
  
 
 
                                                 
5
 See Annex 1 *Interview Guide* 
6
 Cheema et al (2005) 
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4.1 Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracies  
 
The first attempt at decentralisation was carried out in 1959 under Ayub Khan‘s leadership.  
The new local governments, established under the Basic Democracies Ordinance, 1959 and 
the Municipal Administration Ordinance 1960, comprised a hierarchical system of four linked 
tiers. These were sub-provincial tiers, similar to that of the British system that was in place 
pre-partition, where the system was under the bureaucracy through the mechanisms of 
―controlling authority‖ of the District Commissioner, Commissioner and Government. 
Although the new tiers were given many new functions they were practically handicapped due 
to a severely curtailed fiscal capacity as well as their limitations imposed by the ―controlling 
authority‖ that could reverse any decision at their behest. (Siddiqui 1992). The local elections 
were carried out on a non-party basis. As a result of this, the programme being instilled by a 
military government without an elected government, the entire system was rolled back when 
the elected civilian government came into place in 1971. (Britannica, 1992)  
 
 
4.2 Zia’s Local Government Reforms 1979-1985  
 
Local governments were revived through the Local government Ordinances (LGOs) and local 
bodies were elected in all four provinces during 1979 and 1980. (Jalal 1995) Although 
politically important they were not complemented by any further decentralization of federal or 
provincial administrative functions or financial powers to the local level. (Cheema et al 2005). 
Like the first attempt at decentralisation by the Ayub government, the increased importance of 
local governments as a means of political legitimacy did not translate into their substantive 
empowerment. In lieu with Ayub‘s decentralisation effort, Zia‘s local government legislation 
retained suspension powers in the hands of the provincial government, maintaining the weak 
stance of the local governments. Furthermore, Zia too continued to hold local elections on a 
non-party basis.  Historical evidence suggests that these measures resulted in the localization 
and personalization of politics at the local level (Wilder 1999).  In spite of its second attempt, 
local government was rolled back to provincial levels once the new elected government that 
came into power in 1985.  
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4.3 The Devolution Plan 
 
The latest local government system was introduced by General Musharaf in 2000. It formed 
part of the ―Seven point Agenda‖ that aimed for National Reconstruction. The ―Devolution of 
Power‖ was implemented after a series of local elections were held in August 2001. The legal 
basis for devolution of power was the Provincial Local Government Ordinances of 2001. Its 
implementation was carried out by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), through which 
both fiscal and administrative decentralisation took place. The rationale for decentralizing 
governance was twofold; firstly as a tool to counter the mass corruption that was present in all 
sectors of governance, secondly to make local service delivery more efficient. (Local 
Government Book 2002) 
 
Unlike its predecessors, the latest attempt at local government, devolved administrative and 
expenditure responsibilities to local levels, which involved changes in the administrative level 
of decision making, the accountability of the decision making authority (political or 
bureaucratic) and the nature and amount of fiscal resources available. The devolution process 
substantially restructured the sub-provincial (district and below) government structure. There 
were three tiers of local government; District, Tehsil (towns) and Union Councils (village 
level). A new elected government was created at the district level and politically linked to 
local governments at sub-district level. The elected government transferred a large proportion 
of service provision to the local level, including education and healthcare, however the 
departments of police and irrigation were retained by the Provincial Governments.  
 
The local governance system brought in by the Devolution Plan lasted for almost an entire 
decade. It recreates the conditions of a ‗natural experiment,‘ where an institutional reform was 
implemented for almost an entire decade and then rolled back at the behest of the present 
civilian government, to the predecessor  District Commissioner (DC) system where the DC is 
accountable to the provincial government, once again removing powers from local levels.  
 
Unlike the previous local government implementation efforts this one brought about changes 
that were felt by people to the extent that many service providers are sceptical about the 
reform being rolled back. The relocation of government tiers to the provincial capitals, 
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(Lahore, Punjab and Karachi, Sind) has evoked concerns about smaller cities/towns being 
neglected.   
 
5.  The social structures 
 
 
An important aspect that needs to be considered is the social structure in which the devolution 
plan was implemented. One of the undercurrents that still persist both inside and outside of 
the cities is that of the biradari system: local tribal structures where clan relations are 
maintained and affect everyday life so much so that it spills over into the voting patterns of 
the country itself.  
 
5.1 Biradaris 
 
The tribal/clan system is the basis for much of the rural local organization, which draws 
widely on idioms of biraadari solidarity –idioms that suggest the importance of genealogy in 
the construction of local systems of organization and authority. (Gilmartin, 1979) Many tribes 
were pastoralist, ranging over large areas of grazing land.
7
 Local identities were and continue 
to be, based on tribal links, none of which, geographically, was within a so called ring-fence. 
The tribes could spill-over into neighboring regions, however, tribes maintain headquarters of 
sorts, where –according to Tupper, ―they congregate in strength.‖8 The Bhutto clan‘s strength 
congregates in Larkana whereas the Gilani and Querishi clans‘ stronghold is found in the city 
of Multan. 
 
The evolution of the local elites to their present positions can be traced back to the local tribal 
structure that has been prevalent in Pakistan for centuries, which was institutionalized by the 
British during the sub-continent‘s colonization.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Pg. 14 C.L. Tupper (Punjab Customary Law (Calcutta: Government Printing, 1881), 1:2. ―Tupper argues that 
one ‗native institution‘ that existed was that of the ―tribe‖ (birdaarii) 
8
 Pg. 20 of Gilmartin (Baden Powell, Land Systems, 2:611) 
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5.2 Waderos, Zaminadars – the local elites of Pakistan9 
 
A phenomenon that has persisted in Pakistan has been that of its landed gentry, also referred 
to as feudal lords, which was recently covered by The Washington Post, entitled ―Pakistan‘s 
Modern Feudal Lords.‖10 Through his article- covering the Sindi feudal, Jatoi- Lancaster 
manages to capture the respect and authority that the locals pay to the elite. The landed gentry 
dominate within the interiors of the provinces, away from the cities –even 50km outside a city 
such as Multan - where rural lifestyles are maintained even today. The landed gentry referred 
to as the feudal lords, form the ruling class of the country at all levels; local, provincial as 
well as national, exercising not only economic but also social and political power.  
 
Ahmed (1996) provides a good summary of the present day situation of the landed gentry 
within the country and the power they enjoy through their position as landlords. ―The landlord 
class, which continues to be of analytical and political interest, also has an uneven presence 
among different ethnic groups. In absolute numbers and economic, social, and political 
power, first come the landlords of lower and western Punjab, most of who are Siraiki-
speaking, but closely integrated with the Punjabi ruling class… The [former] President of 
Pakistan, Farooq Leghari, is a good example.[Present prime minister Syed Yousaf Reza 
Gilani of Multan is a good example.] Next come the landlords of Sindh, who in the absence of 
a Sindhi bourgeoisie and a strong middle class, enjoy the position of being economically, 
socially, and politically the most powerful class of the Sindhi society [present day example is  
President Asif Ali Zardari of Larkana].‖11 
 
6. Why Multan and Larkana 
 
In line with Keefer et al(2005), Multan and Larkana provide a poignant comparative case 
                                                 
9
 Wadero: Sindi term for big landowner, and zamindar: lit., landholder: under British law, designated as a person 
recognized as possessing proprietary rights over land. Ansari, S. Sufi Saints of and State Power: The pirs of Sind 
1843 -1947. 
10
 Lancaster, John. ―Pakistan‘s Modern Feudal Lords‖ Washington Post, April 8, 2003 
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study. Both cities suffer from the local governments being captured by local elite and were 
part of the decentralisation process implemented by the NRB. (Shah 2011) The interesting 
aspect of the decentralisation process has been the different results that it achieved in Multan 
and Larkana. That of interest is the different results in QoG in connection with the different 
power structure of the elite in each city and the outcomes both cities experienced as a result of 
the instilling of local governments. Regional disparities grew stronger, Multan‘s QoG 
improved whereas that of Larkana‘s remained either stagnant or worse. Due to its improved 
QoG the World Bank‘s Doing Business has ranked Multan as the second best place to start up 
a business, whereas Larkana has become the focal point for international development efforts 
(UNDP, 2011), evidenced through the city serving as Sindh headquarters for both the UNDP 
as well as the Red Crescent operations centre with majority projects concerning education and 
healthcare focused in the city itself.  
 
6.1 The structure of the Local elite  
 
Multan  
Multan‘s local elite is made up of the Gilani and Qureshi clans. They constitute both the 
political and religious elites and have maintained these positions since pre-partition. As 
hereditary sainthood has passed from father to son, so have the various political appointments 
shared between the two clans.  The Gilani family has served as governors of Multan since the 
time of Jahangir and Shah Jahan and have continued to be in the political lime light till 
present day where Syed Yousaf Reza Gilani serves as the country‘s Prime minister.12  
On the other hand is the Qureshi family. The British acknowledged the importance of this 
family as the most powerful within the district, both due to its landholdings but also due to its 
dual role of religious leadership. ―In no division are there so few Chiefs as in that of 
Mooltan…In the Mooltan District, the foremost and most influential man is Mukhdoom Shah 
                                                 
12
  Lepel Griffin and Charles Massy, Chiefs and Failikes of Note in the Punjab*(Lahore: Civil and Military 
Gazette Press, 1910), 2:324. 
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Muhmood, the Head of the Shrine of Bahawl Huq.‖13 The political and religious stronghold of 
the family is in place even today: politically, Shah Mehmood Querishi served as the Foreign 
Minister (2008 -2011) and presently serves as one of the main Members of National 
Assembly (MNA) representing Multan. Religiously, the clan is the custodian of the shrine of 
Baha‘uddin Zachariya, whose lineage they are said to be from. Their religious following is 
spread throughout South Asia.  
 
The rivalry of these two families for influence within Multan dates back to pre-partition 
Gilmartin (1988) discusses the factional rivalry that has centered on the political opposition 
between the two leading religious families of Multan city, the Querishies, sajjada nishins of 
the Suhrawardy shrine of Bahawal Haq, and the Gilanis, sajjada nishins of the Qadri shrine of 
Musa Pak Shahid. The political opposition can be traced back in history where Querisihis and 
Gilanis battled for control of the district board and the Multan Municipal Committee through 
the 1920s and 1930s. The first non-official chairmen of both of these bodies were Gilanis; the 
two factions traded control on more than one occasion. Querishis and Gilanis also dominated 
contests for the provincial Council and for the central Legislative Assembly. The latest 
political opposition played out between Shah Mehmood Querishi and Prime Minister Gilani 
earlier this year, which resulted in Shah Mehmood Querishis resignation as Foreign Minister. 
(Daily Times, Feb 2011)  
 
Friction between the two families has been at the political level whereas on the level of 
religious leadership both families have maintained their strongholds and followers through the 
separate shrines. The political rivalry is evidenced through the fact that both clans have 
historically sided with different political parties, as well as the allegiances of the different 
Members of National Assembly as recorded by the electoral commission. (The present prime 
minister, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, hails from the Gilani clan of Multan and also serves as the 
MNA representing Multan, of which there are a total of six MNAs. From the Querishi family, 
Shah Mehmood Querishi served as the foreign minister until his recent resignation. He too 
serves as one of the main MNAs representing Multan.  
 
                                                 
13
 Secretary, Board of Administration, Punjab to secretary, Government of India, Foreign department, 13 
September 1860 (Board of Revenue, file 131 /1575.)  
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Larkana 
 
Unlike Multan, Larkana has remained the stronghold of a single clan -the Bhutto‘s. 14 As a 
wadero family their landholdings increased during the service of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who 
was given many honours of land grants as well as knighthood during his tenure with the 
British administration. When Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto stood for elections he rallied support with 
the help of the local Sindhi pirs, whom helped strengthen his electoral base. The support of 
the religious leaders was pivotal in the resulting victory. (Ansari,1992). The family has 
remained in the forefront of the Pakistani political scene ever since – Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto – 
served as foreign minister (1963), prime minister (1973 –77) and president (1977), Benzir 
Bhutto (1988, 1993- 96). Today the city is synonymous with both the Bhutto clan and the 
political party that was put in place by Z.A. Bhutto the People‘s Party of Pakistan (PPP).  
 
Since the formation of the PPP it has been synonymous with the Bhutto family name. The 
leader of the PPP has always been a member of the family itself, beginning with Z.A. Bhutto, 
Begum Nusrat Bhutto (1979), Benazir Bhutto (1986 -2007), and at present it is headed by 
Bilawal Zardari Bhutto. Traditionally the Bhutto family hold wadero status, their transition 
into the religious/spiritual leadership role took hold as a result of the mysterious deaths of its 
members as famously predicted by Z.A. Bhutto. (Taseer, 1979). Their graves are presently 
treated as shrines by their followers where respects are paid and intercession sought, both on 
religious and political planes.  
 
 
6.2 The dual role of the local elites 
 
Many a times the local elites played the role of intermediary on more than one front, that is 
both ´political –between the central government and the local population –and religious –that 
is the role of intermediary between God and the locals. These families enjoy a power that is 
revered as holy; some families trace their lineages back to the family of the prophet 
                                                 
14
 Taseer, Salman (1979) Bhutto: a Political Biography 
Ansari, S. (1992) Sufi Saints and State Power –The Pirs of Sind, 1843 -1947  
 
  
23 
 
Mohammed, and are considered pirs (the local term for saints), whereas some have acquired 
saintly status due to their services to the country, as is evidenced by the example of the Bhutto 
family. The ‗sainthood‘ authority is seen as hereditary (Ansari, 1992) and is passed on to the 
offspring of the present family heads.   
 
In order to fully understand the role played by these local elites it is important to look at the 
duality of their roles in these respective cities. In general, to be able to retain political power a 
candidate must have the support of the religious leaders, this has been the pattern since pre-
partition and is still the case today.  
 
The local elites in both Multan and Larkana play a dual role, they are both political leaders as 
well as religious/spiritual leaders. This position is robust, their religious power strengthens 
their political power. As ‗holy men‘ their actions within the political realm at the local level 
are not questioned nor doubted by their followers (both political and religious followers in 
this case). If the power structure resembles that of Larkana where there is a monopoly of one 
family then decentralized governance increases their powers, where the local executive 
district officers (EDOs), who are responsible for the delivery of public services at the district 
level, are more concerned with satisfying the local elite in order to secure their own positions 
as well as eventual ‗cuts‘ in contract fees etc, instead of performing their prescribed roles as 
government servants. 
 
However where local power is fragmented between more than one clan, a situation of local 
competition is present, creating a system of checks and balances, allowing for improvements 
to trickle down to local population, evidenced by the fragmented representation of the six 
members of national assembly (MNAs) at the National Assembly.  
 
7. Bottom up governance: the view from below 
 
Overall QoG 
 
The first impressions of both Multan and Larkana are very similar. Multan portrays a 
powerful presence of the Gilani clan, superimposed with large posters as well as banners of 
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the Prime Minister at every 25 to 30 metres, along the roads being driven. On the other end of 
the spectrum there is the city of Larkana. The first impressions, as expressed by Red Crescent 
researchers, are the prominence of Shia culture, various symbols and salutations to Imam Ali 
and his family; the sect to which the Bhutto family belong and practice. Hand in hand is the 
looming presence of the Bhuttos, through banners portraying various family members of the 
Bhutto family at every turn, reinforcing the city as the stronghold of the Bhutto clan.  
 
The Social Audit of Local Governance and Delivery of Public Services (UNDP 2010) 
provides a comparison of three separate audits carried out by the DTCE at the district level. 
Results from this indicate upward trends in household satisfaction with government services 
pertaining to the provision of education and healthcare as well as law enforcement.  
 
The data from the interviews together with that of the Social Audits empirical data, indicate 
that comparatively to Larkana (Sindh) the districts of Multan and generally those within 
Punjab are doing much better, within education and health the local governance system has 
delivered. There is a marked difference between Sindh and Punjab in terms of delivery of 
these services. However, in contrast to the Social Audit‘s findings (UNDP 2010) the interview 
data indicates general dissatisfaction and distrust of the local law enforcement, i.e. the local 
police and the courts. 
 
From the interviews with the local experts in Multan, the impression gathered is that the local 
government takes interest in the betterment of its people, whereas the experts in Larkana point 
to collusion within the bureaucracy (EDOs) and the elected local government staff – local 
nazims - forwarding the proverb of the Raja and the horse.
15
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 Interview with former and present local nazims: ―Let me give an example. There was a raja who was raising a 
horse. He had a servant who had orders to feed the horse 5kgs of chickpeas, so what the servant did was he 
would feed 4 kgs to the horse and keep a kilo for himself. The horse was getting weak as he wasn‘t getting 
enough food. So the Raja said that the servant must be swindling some of the fodder that he is being given for 
the horse. So he employed another servant, to supervise the first horse caretaker. The first servant and the second 
servant came to an agreement, that they will keep one kilo of grain each and feed only 3 kgs to the horse. The 
horse continued to get weak. So the raja suspecting this hired yet another servant that should supervise these two 
first servants that he had. So now all three servants came to an agreement of keeping a kilo of grain each and 
feeding the horse 2 kgs. This way the horse was getting weaker and not getting anything. That is exactly how our 
government is like, each tier of government is eating, just like that horse this country is starving and dying on all 
aspects.‖  
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7.1 Education  
 
A lot of importance is given to education as it has become the basis on which even mediocre 
jobs are gained. The relative user satisfaction since 2001 has had an upwards trend, with 58% 
of those interviewed as part of the Social Audit (UNDP 2010) reporting relative satisfaction, 
an increase from 2002 and 2004. In all aspects of education Multan (Punjab) is constantly 
ranked higher than Larkana (Sind); enrolment figures, the gender gaps in enrolment being 
much higher in Larkana than that of Multan, where the general literacy of girls has constantly 
been going up, as well as overall literacy rates. 
16
  
 
 
Multan 
 
The district system has helped to improve local set-ups, Multan has been a focus of the 
government one of the examples is the provision of tertiary education - university education. 
From the interview data gathered, the perceptions are that universities have improved; the 
facility of being able to pursue doctoral studies have now begun in quite a few disciplines, 
which previously was unavailable to students. Another factor that has enabled higher 
education is that more university campuses have been established. Earlier there were only 2 
universities in South Punjab (University of Multan and Bahawalpur).  
 
The number of subjects offered has improved too, and subject specialists have also come to 
the universities. Before there were only a handful of subjects within which masters degrees 
were offered. On the other end, the opinions voiced were that primary level education has not 
seen such a change, nor at the secondary level. 
 
Incentive schemes 
The local governments introduced incentive schemes, which were monetary at first but when 
the local government could not scoff up the money then the teachers were awarded 
appreciation certificates that recognised their services, this was at district and tehsil levels.  
                                                 
16
 Children (aged 5-14 years) Enrolled in School:  
Multan; Girls 81.16% and Boys 86% 
Larkana: Girls 60% and Boys 72% 
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When speaking with the principal of the local Girls College (which has a population of 600 
students), the improvement in the quality of education that the students were being offered 
had improved immensely. The local government introduced incentive mechanisms for both 
students and staff. Out of the staff, a handful had won competitive incentive schemes both at 
district and tehsil levels, an indicator to both the local community and the staff of its improved 
results.  
 
The incentive schemes for students introduced were stipend schemes for pupils, where the 
pupil receives 200 rupees a month and also more books have been provided to the schools. 
The stipends have been a way to encourage education especially among girls. 
 
These schemes have increased a lot, and are awarded on the basis of the school‘s 
performance. The principal of the local boy‘s school (a population of 900 students) informs 
that last year the school performed quite well in the district, so each teacher was awarded 
6000 PKR per head. The amounts have increased from year to year, the present amount 
offered per teacher at 10,000:- PKR. 
 
 The latest incentive scheme has been the ―best teacher award‖ at district level, where the 
teacher with the best performance will be awarded 50,000:- PKR. So yes, there are a lot of 
incentive schemes that are in place. School staff are informed of the incentive schemes 
beforehand, however there can be gaps in the access to information as one local expert 
pointed out.  
 
Improved schools/ing at expense of more corruption?  
 
The general consensus of the local experts was that the quality of schools has increased but 
also that corruption has most certainly increased. The situation explained is that previously 
there was only one person to bribe, whereas, with the increase of government levels, there is 
bribing required at every level. The reflection is that the initial idea was good but the 
execution was not done properly.  
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An example is that of the local Girls College visited. The principal points out that in order to 
bring about change, there must be an enabling environment, not just a change in labels and 
titles. ―They made us change the name of the school to English Medium High School. In 
practice however, the situation is that none of our teachers have had training to become 
English medium teachers, there are 600 students and only a staff of 20 teachers. Now tell me, 
in the nursery each class can have up to 60 pupils, how can a teacher cater for that many 
students on her own and also give them any form of good education? The teacher is supposed 
to tend to all the pupils‘ needs but how! All that has been done is the signboard is changed.‖ 
 
The renaming of the school highlights the practice of bringing change on paper and none in 
practice. The improvement in quality appears to be the result of the individual efforts of staff 
within the various schools. However, in order to bring about sustainable change that will raise 
the general standards, specific training is needed, as pointed out above. The education experts 
point out that the government has imposed a minimum of 30 students per teacher. This 
however is seen as a drawback by the teachers, who find that they cannot pay sufficient 
attention to weaker students, and are forced to carry on the lesson in order to fulfil the 
assigned syllabus.  
 
Further, an explicit example of petty corruption having increased is in relation to the release 
of the annual budgets of the local schools. Previously the budgets would be released directly 
into the respective accounts of the schools (by the Provincial Government). At present, the 
budget is released into the schools account by the district accounts‘ office, which falls under 
the EDO Education. Later, an officer from the accounts‘ office pays a visit to the school, 
where he collects 15% of the budget released as part of his ―commission‖ for having done his 
job. The result is that the book keeping records are transparent, with no evidence of bribes. If 
the ―commission‖ is not paid, release of the payment is withheld by the local accounts office, 
creating unnecessary hinders in the school‘s carrying out of its day to day activities, therefore 
in order to keep things flowing smoothly, the ―commission‖ is paid.  
 
Furthermore, criticism is raised regarding the monitoring mechanism that the local 
government has instilled. It was put in place to check on teachers, from the National 
Commission for Human Development. They observe and report, however no action is taken. 
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One of the cases given was where a teacher was tardy on a regular basis, which the school 
wanted to alter. A government monitor was brought in to monitor the situation, but all that 
was done was recording. The assurance that no action taken has resulted in the teachers not 
being motivated to alter their behaviour. If a complaint regarding a teacher is reported, via the 
clerk, and if the clerk and that teacher are on good terms, then he will never actually get the 
report to the Executive District Officer (EDO) of Education. That‘s the end of the case. The 
District Coordinating Officer (DCO) is bound by the report of the EDO, and in turn the school 
is bound by the DCO, it is a catch-22 situation.  
 
The situation reinforces the grievance that the local government system has merely created 
new layers of government on ‗paper‘ where there is a large gap in the checks and balances 
that would apply to the local bureaucracy and its interaction with the local staffs. 
 
 
Larkana 
 
The quality of education provision in Larkana has lagged behind that of Multan. While 
acknowledging that government schools are free of cost (which was the primary reason listed 
for sending their children to these facilities) the general concern was the under-provision of 
schools facilities themselves.  
A persistent problem faced by the city is that of ―Ghost schools‖. The interview with NGO 
workers that have been active in the local education sector shed some light on the situation.  
 
Experts agree that the problem is wide – teacher absenteeism, lack of basic amenities such as 
drinking water and toilets as well as inadequate supplies of text books. Sometimes there exists 
all the paperwork, but when you come to the location there is not even a building present. If 
there is a building, it is a construction without a school in it.  
 
The last school spontaneously visited, was a building made up of ten rooms. Out of these ten 
rooms only 5 are being manned by a teacher physically present. When the administration is 
questioned as to where the missing teacher of the first room is, we are informed that she is on 
maternal leave. This can of course be a situation that can occur anywhere. However, suspicion 
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was raised when the same explanation was offered regarding the absence of teachers in the 
remaining four classrooms. The principal either does not have anything to say or just reports 
that the teacher is either on sick leave or maternal leave. Upon this, the pay roll is inspected, 
where salaries of 10 teachers each month are being dispensed and these are ‗signed‘ for by the 
recipient teacher, not by signature but by thumb prints. 
Another problem that is said to affect the enrolment rate of girls, aged 12 and above, is the 
lack of toilet facilities. When the staff is questioned about what facilities students utilise in 
their 8 hours spent at school, it is explained that students utilise the facilities of the homes 
surrounding the school if needed. Such problems are reported in the interiors of both 
provinces of Punjab and Sind.  
 
A recent problem reported was that of a private company renting children for the days of 
inspection –those inspections carried out by international donors within the development 
sector. The discovery of this was first covered by the local media when the incident occurred 
in Toba Tek Singh. (Interview with Ijaz Naqvi. Former MOD head) 
 
 
Increased “schools” at the expense of more corruption?  
 
The continuing presence of ―Ghost Schools‖ are the result of development funds that have 
been deviated -resulting in an increase in education quantity (school buildings) but no 
increase in education quality. The situation in Larkana is such that the provision of schools 
has ‗increased‘ merely on paper, the quality of the schools is not reported to have improved, 
neither from the results of the interview data nor from that of the Social Audit (UNDP 2002).  
 
The issue of ―ghost schools‖ is the result of corrupt activities between the local EDO of 
Education mismanaging funds, together with the bureaucracy that has failed to maintain a 
standard through regular inspections of facilities and approving budgets without correlating to 
the results on site.   
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7.2 Healthcare  
 
Multan 
 
The overall quality of healthcare provision has improved through various measures; some of 
these include efforts within the private sector as well as those provided by the government. 
There have been different NGOs starting different health programs, more hospitals have been 
made in Multan and Khanewal. Even on the government level there has been much 
improvement. One example given by the government doctor, is the presence of the Nishtar 
Medical College. It is a teaching hospital in Multan, which is world renowned, where there 
has been improvement in healthcare provision as well.  
 
One comparative example given was that prior to the local government system, the doctors 
would not actually see the patients; however this no longer is the case. One of the reasons 
mentioned is that on the local level, the regulations have been tightened around doctors, 
especially where teaching doctors have been told to take up their quota outside the hospital, so 
that people find out that there are professionals to tend to you. One of the medical experts is 
quick to point out that health services improving is not limited to its provision but is also 
health prevention, in the case of local sewerages being covered, preventing diseases from 
spreading etc, a measure that has been successful in Multan.  
 
Regarding provision of primary healthcare, improvements included provision of TB meds 
being available at all health stations, at the Basic Health Units  (which is at a distance of 
4km), at the Tehsil level, followed by the bigger facilities available at the District hospital.  
 
The service of Basic Health Units is available at every twelve kilometres, this was argued to 
be an improvement by some whereas others voiced that local charity hospitals, such as that of 
Omar Medicare, were taking on majority of the primary healthcare load, free of cost, but 
privately-run.  
 
A reason attributed to the improvement in the quality of healthcare is the recruitment at local 
level. It was efficient time wise; if there was a slot open, it was made public immediately and 
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one could apply to their locality and remain within range of say wherever one is perhaps 
living.  
 
Now as the recruitment of public staff has been taken back by Lahore (due to the reverting to 
the old Provincial set ups), the allocation of jobs will be as bizarre as it had been before the 
implementation of local governments; where a person living in Attock will get a post in Dera 
Gazi Khan and the worker from Dera Gazi Khan appointed to Attock. Through the 
recruitment of locals at the local level, there was a local trust and a relationship that the 
medical worker as a local wanted to maintain.   
 
Another factor is increased manpower; there is more trained staff. Previously the healthcare 
system was dependent on Lahore and Rawalpindi. If one fell ill or needed anti-natal care, or 
in the case of childbirth, there was no local facility. Since the introduction of local 
government, there has been an improvement at the tehsil (sub-district) level, where 
departments have either been created or expanded –such as cardiology, gynecology, all are 
now available at the tehsil hospitals instead of the capital of the district, relieving a lot of the 
load.  
 
 
Healthcare – no strings attached?  
 
Increased healthcare provision has come at a price - increased corruption at the local level. An 
interview with the local charity hospital underscores that the improvements that have taken 
place have been with strings attached.  After the floods of 2011, funds were released to the 
affected districts‘ EDOs Health to cater for the medical needs of the flood victims. The EDO 
Health had approached the charity Omar Medicare, to help set up medical camps in affected 
zones. The management of Omar Medicare agreed to the proposition and set up a total of 3 
medical camps in conjunction with the local EDO Health.  
 
Omar Medicare set up camps where they provided: medicines and the services of their own 
doctors that the NGO employs as well as their own equipment. There were picture 
opportunities where the EDO Health attended and the event was covered by the local press 
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and media, in which the article detailed how the EDO had allocated 500,000 Pakistani Rupees 
in cash funds in order to hold each of the medical camps.  
 
The management of the charity explicitly rebut the claim, showing records of how the costs 
were borne by the charity itself, and that they had not received any money from the EDO to 
hold the medical-camp. Instead Omar Medicare had provided all equipment, medical and 
other, medications, provided the services of their own medical staff, as well as paid for their 
own transportation –including costs of petrol. They had only interacted with the EDO when 
he came for the event to be recorded by the media.  
 
Upon this information that was flashed in the local media, the head of Omar Medicare, a local 
landlord, contacted the EDO that had brought the proposal to its management. The alleged 
corrupt act was questioned whereupon the EDO Health offered an explanation that ―we all 
need something to live on‖ and offered to give a portion of the financial gains to the Charity‘s 
director, which was rejected. This resulted in Omar Medicare suspending all future 
cooperation with the local government regarding health provision. The reasons provided is 
that being charity they work on reputation and cannot afford to taint this reputation by 
involving themselves with the corrupt officials.   
 
 
 
Larkana 
 
The situation in Larkana is in stark contrast to that of Multan. There is an increase in the 
presence of NGOs, both local and international, that are providing immunization facilities. 
However, according to households interviewed 40% considered that they had no access to 
government healthcare, whereas 28.4% of the households were dissatisfied with the services. 
(UNDP 2010)  
 
Basic Health Units (BHUs) that were part of the predicted improvements that local 
government was to bring to primary healthcare provision, are still not in place. The locals 
complain that the few BHUs that actually are in place are not manned by certified medical 
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staff; sometimes they are staffed by a dispenser at others it can be the chaprassi (Urdu for 
caretaker). 
 
The amount of citizens turning to government facilities reduced over the years, and this was 
mirrored by an increased use of unqualified practitioners, such as natural healers or local 
hakims (local Ayurveda healers.) The reasons mentioned is the ease of access and the fact that 
these unqualified practitioners are always available, even for home visits (DTCE/CIET social 
audit 2004/2005). 
Another complaint that continues to be present is the lack of medicines at the government 
medical facilities, both absence of emergency medical staff and lack of medicine is said to 
have resulted in fatalities in some situations.  
 
 
No Healthcare –still strings attached 
 
The most common question raised by the local experts is where are the funds going if there 
are no results on ground? One problem is that the locals are unaware of the reporting systems, 
that is where to lodge their complaints regarding the lack of facilities available. On ground the 
strong presence of healthcare programs being offered are those by the NGOs on ground, of 
the households interviewed a total of 45% had got children immunised through drive of 
government. Over the years the private healthcare providers have seen an increase in patients, 
because many of the locals complain that, when a doctor finally is available at the clinics they 
are more interested in running their private clinics instead of actually tending to the patients at 
hand. The problem can be related to the fact that nationally the doctors have been striking 
since the start of 2011, regarding pay scales being a dire 22,000:- PKR a month, whereas a 
constable inspector is making 23,000:-. 
 
7.3 Law enforcement  
Police  
The one service that was not fully decentralised was that of the law enforcement – the police 
force. Initially the police functions were planned to be devolved to the district level, however 
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till date it falls under the purview of the federal government, even though politically, the 
police is answerable to the district nazim. The fact that the recruitment as well as all aspects 
pertaining to the police employment still falls under the federal government, has effectively 
resulted in same opinions from both Multan and Larkana.  
 
The results from the Social Audit (2010) show that in cases pertaining to personal safety in 
Multan, only 20.5% would contact the police, with only a 13.1% in Larkana. The numbers 
decrease drastically in both cities in cases pertaining to the reporting of a threat to personal 
property; Multan 6.6% and 5.5% in Larkana. 
 
The opinions about the police were similar in both Multan and Larkana where the 
overwhelming majority interviewed believed that the police was not there to help you, in fact 
if you had been robbed or mugged it is better to ‗deal‘ with the situation on your own, because 
reporting the crime to the police is met with hindrances and unhelpful behaviour on the part of 
the police officers. The experts felt that, if one went to the police apart from not receiving any 
help, one should expect to lose even the little you have left, in bribes etc.  
 
Both cities reported no improvement in the local law enforcement. The citizenry in both cities 
highlighted the absence of trust in the police force and the courts to deliver justice. Anecdotal 
evidence that was presented was that in majority of the situations, wherever there has been a 
dacoit or robbery, the police is said to be party to the act itself. Having prior knowledge of the 
robbery puts the police in a position to extort a ‗fee‘ for their service of registering complaints 
and carrying out investigations, the fee varies according to the victim, the richer the victim is 
perceived the higher the fee.  
 
The apparent change however has been seen in an increase in the number of police stations 
available, the force suffers from corruption they remain inaccessible to the public. 
 
A factor common to both cities was that of fear. The experts report fear as the main cause of 
not turning to the police, being scared of them and their ways, which include misuse of power 
wherever and whenever, such as reporting a fake case and use it against one. 
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Elected local officials 
 
Another aspect of the overall quality of government improving is that of accessibility of local 
government servants. The local government staff such as the union councillors, UC, (the 
lowest tier of local government), are elected from within the people, as such they are willing 
to meet with the citizens. At this level it is easier to meet, if there is a grievance you know 
exactly who one should turn to. If the matter is within their power they will be able to help 
resolve your issue, if outside their purview they will take the issue further up such the local 
government hierarchy, such as the tehsil nazim (sub-district level) or district nazim; to the 
level where it can be resolved. The previous set up, prior to the Devolution Plan, made it 
impossible to meet with the politicians and the MNAs etc. as they were based in the 
provincial capitals and would only be seen during election times. But as the UCs are from 
amongst the local population they are easily available as are the mayors. Resulting from this, 
the way one is approached by the police also became different. They would actually register 
your complaint and try to resolve matters unlike before when the complaints would go 
unheard.  
 
 
Impartiality 
 
The overall impression from the empirical data is that political might and economic influence 
will affect the impartiality of services offered. A factor that differed strongly between the two 
cities was that of impartiality on the basis of ethnicity.  
 
In Multan, comparatively to Larkana there is not much importance given to the cultural 
differences, like ethnicity. There is more tolerance reported in Multan, which is also 
evidenced by the fact that there is so little ethnic violence there. One reason for this can be the 
diversity of the local population of the city itself, whereas Larkana is ethnically much more 
homogenous.   
 
One of the medical staff elaborates on his experiences when serving in Larkana ―I have been 
stationed within the interiors of Sindh and there I have witnessed a lot of difference in 
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treatment. If a Punjabi were to be at a Sindhi hospital, then the Sindhi will be seen first then 
the Punjabi.‖ 
 
 
8. Wadero/ Zamindar System? 
 
 
The general impression when asked the importance of belonging to a wadera family 
background in order to get into the political scene is overwhelming – this is the overarching 
prerequisite if one wants to be in politics. Out of all the experts interviewed all agreed that in 
order to get into politics, having good rapport with the local elites was not sufficient, but one 
must be from those families. The explanations offered are that both power and money are 
needed in order to get into the so called ‗game‘. 
 
An example is the present Paksitani Parliamment, in which only a handful of MPs are there 
due to merit, otherwise all of them are there because of their family history and background. 
Examples abound, one in point is the current leadership of the country; the President, Asif Ali 
Zardari, is a wadero married into the Bhutto family; Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Reza Gilani, 
local elite of Multan, Foreign Minister Khar; the daughter of the prominent wadero Khar of 
the Punjab.   
 
PM Gilani‘s tenure as PM has said to make a huge difference to the family‘s stronghold 
within political power, because from the start politics has been within the stronghold of some 
families, it is not changing hands, it has been coming down in the family. There are no new 
people.  
 
Patterns can be traced of how one clan spreads its tentacles in the political arena; placing one 
of its members into one political party, simultaneously as another family member is joins the 
opposition. It‘s the same tactics with different faces. Furthermore, in Pakistan, the wadero 
families whether they are in Sind or Punjab, all are somehow related. The patterns are such 
that they intermarry in order to keep alliances.  
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The interesting trend however was that the overwhelming majority mentioned the stronghold 
of these families to be prominent at the district levels, from where they compete for the seats 
in the Provincial and National Assemblies (i.e. MNAs and MPAs). It is at these levels, 
national and provincial, where the local elite families rigorously compete between each other 
especially for the MNA seats, during which much money is spent. In Multan the MNA 
listings show a clear competition between the local elites whereas the MNA listings for 
Larkana all belong to the PPP – the Bhutto family‘s political party. Where there has been 
competition there has been a trickle down effect to the local population, however these 
families are said to always retain the stronghold on their areas; it is a territorial thing.  
 
The competition aspect is seen as positive by the local experts, stating “if there is 
fragmentation there is more chances of criticism being raised. Like the example of Multan, 
there is a situation where a comparison is made by the people. On the other hand if there is 
one clan then they have a monopoly so they are safe from public scrutiny as well as 
comparison.” 
 
One expert explains that every area is under certain MNAs, and the citizenry are obliged to 
MNAs or Landlords, which results in them casting their votes wherever the MNA or Landlord 
tells them to. They don‘t tend to voice complaints instead they tolerate the injustices that are 
done to them, for fear of having their situations worsened and also because it is very rare for 
people to voice their complaints publicly.  
 
The introduction of the local government system has said to have made the government more 
accessible – the people are able to access the government, whereas before you could not do so 
when there was the system of MNA and MPA, all of which operated from the Provincial 
capitals. However, it is only at the sub-district levels that the accessibility is felt. The MNAs 
are voted from city districts, such as Multan and Larkana. At this level the MNAs, although 
elected by the citizens, remain unavailable to the local population.  
 
Wilder (1999) manages to capture this attitude through quotes from some former members of 
the National Assembly from Punjab as saying:  
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“People now think that the job of an MNA and MPA is to fix their gutters, get their children 
enrolled in school, arrange for job transfers...[These tasks] consume your whole day….” (p. 
196); “Look, we get elected because we are ba asr log [effective people] in our area. People 
vote for me because they perceive me as someone who can help them...Somebody‟s son is a 
matric fail and I get him a job as a teacher or a government servant. . .”(p. 204).  
 
Apart from giving a gist of the attitude prevalent within the MNAs these quotes also give a 
starting point to the reasons behind voter selection, of which only a minor aspect is portrayed.  
 
 
9. Voting: representational tool? 
 
 
Experts agree that voting today is still strongly based on the biraadari system. Many also 
argue that the biraadari system itself is not as strong as it used to be. It appears that the 
weakening of the biradaari system is superficial, because when local experts are asked where 
they cast their vote the response is ―wherever Baba jee (the head of our family) tells us to.‖  
 
Reasons advanced for the continuation of these voting patterns are that first of all, that is what 
has been happening generation after generation. Apart from tradition, the reason elaborated 
upon is that it is these elders that are turned to in order to resolve matters of concern; ranging 
from  dealing with land titles and getting ID cards or any issue for that matter. The reason is 
plain and simple – the citizens do not have the same connections as the elders do. 
 
“No one is voting on manifestos. It‟s voting by family. The head of the family keeps the IDs of 
all its family members and you say „here take 200 rupees and go vote tomorrow‟ The reason 
they vote for their own people is because they know that only their own biraadari member will 
help them in time of need, an example is that of going to the courts… The Varraich will get 
the Varraich vote and the Gilani will get the Gilani votes.” 
 
The voting is not based on the basis of the individual – it takes the form of communal voting. 
The question of poorer farmers voting for someone they believe in does not occur because 
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they are more concerned with their income and hence would willingly sell their vote, honesty 
is not priority for the vote collector. Another situation that occurs regularly is exchanging 
ones vote for a favour to be carried out. 
 
 Apart from the biradaari basis of voting, ‗vote collection‘ also ensues at the shrines where the 
waderas sit, especially during the annual Urs.
17
 Experts concur that during these occasions, 
the local elites not only earn a lot of money from the followers that are visiting and donating 
to the shrines, but also that these instances are key to an insight into the power the local elites 
exercise, a small example is people touching the feet of these leaders.  
 
The penalties for not casting ones votes in the ‗right‘ direction can be costly for some. An 
example given by one expert is ―the last MNA, he penalized the area that did not vote for him; 
they get robberies arranged and also keep basic means such as gas connections. If you are a 
public servant they make life hell for you. They want you to be under their control.‖ 
 
In the rural areas the issue of voting is one of gravity, where the citizens look at who is the 
most powerful one (when casting their votes) as they are concerned with who it is that can 
help them in cases of emergency, therefore a person‘s integrity etc. don‘t really matter as 
much.  
 
It is this communal voting, based on the biraadari system that has formed the foundations for 
the strength of the local elites. It highlights that decentralisation in these conditions, where 
power structures are as such, cannot bring about true representation as voting is largely based 
on clan loyalties/connections etc. Voting is not a representational tool of public choices 
instead it is more of an indicator of the strongholds of the existing clans.  
 
 
10. Overview of findings and recommendations 
 
Both Multan and Larkana were part of the nation-wide decentralisation programme. Apart 
from sharing similar social and economic aspects, both cities are known for their local elites 
                                                 
17
 The annual celebration of the death of a Sufi saint and the occasion for a pilgrimage to his tomb. 
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and their capture of local governments. However the fundamental difference between the 
cities lies in the structure of their local elites, Multan‘s is made up of more than two clans, 
whereas Larkana is the monopoly of the Bhutto family.  
 
The evidence of the competition and monopoly situation is found in the MNA representation; 
the six MNA seats of Multan being split between the clans that form the local elite, whereas 
the four MNAs of Larkana all belong to the political party of Larkana‘s local elite – the 
Bhutto family.  
 
The effect of the structure of the local elites resulted in the cities experiencing vastly different 
outcomes as a result of decentralisation. The interactive effect of this was that the QoG in 
Multan increased alongside an increase in local corruption levels. On the other hand, the 
effect in Larkana was a lowering of overall QoG together with an increase in local levels of 
corruption.  
 
The stronghold of these local elites is strengthened through the voting system, which is based 
on the social structure of biraadaris – which is prevalent throughout the country. The voting 
system is not representative of the local choices as voting is not individual but on a communal 
basis.  
 
This study sheds light on how decentralisation can create new layers of government, not 
effectively brining government closer to people, only bringing the sub-district level of 
government closer to the people, while substantially allowing local elites to maintain the hold 
on power. The study emphasises the importance of nurturing local understandings of concepts 
such as decentralisation and representation, warning of the dangers that are brought about 
through implementation of blueprints.  
 
When recommending implementation of decentralisation programmes, policymakers should 
take into account local social structures. The absence of this has resulted in decentralisation 
efforts creating stronger regional disparities within the borders of one nation.  
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Annex II 
    
 
MEASURING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT AND SUBNATIONAL VARIATION 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Do you agree with where our data places you within your country as regards to QoG? If 
not, why? 
 
2. Do you think this assessment reflects how foreign investors see your region?  
 
3. Does your region receive more or less FDI, tourism or other outside capital due to its 
perceived QoG? 
 
 
MEDIA  
 
4.  What level of confidence do you have in the following institutions? :                            
   
     Police 
Media                                                       
Government of the region                             
Political parties                                       
Business owners 
Hospitals 
 
5. What level of confidence do you have in the news you get from:   
 
1. Television 
2. Radio 
3. Newspapers 
4. On-line news agencies 
 
6. Do you consider that there are obstacles to the freedom of press in the region? In your 
opinion, what are the most important? Is there any specific factor or agent, which hinders or 
affects the freedom of press today? 
 
7. Do you think that the news you read, listen or watch in the local media, truly reflects what 
is happening in the region?  
 
8. How independent do you think the media in this Region? 
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9. Does the media have total freedom to report what is happening in issues of…?: 
 
1. Corruption 
2. Security 
3. Economics 
4. Politics   
5. Public health 
 
10. Do you think the media protects or attacks the Government of the Region? Why? 
 
 
11. Which form of media do you think is more reliable: state-owned, or private-owned? Why? 
 
 12. In your opinion, there is more freedom of press today, or twenty years ago? Why? 
 
Recruitment  process and working-place 
 
 13. Are various types of contacts (personal/ business/ political) important when hiring new 
employees? Do you think it differs between this region and other regions in the country? 
 
14. What is the percentage of employees who have been hired on a political/personal/business 
contacts basis?  
 
15. How do you perceive the long-term stability of young employees in public service and 
their interest in a career within the public institutions? 
 
16. How do you account for the length of the hiring process in the public institutions? (a short 
procedure might point out at possible corruption, insufficient publicity and political 
involvement). 
   
17. Could you state the approximate length of the hiring process?  
 
18. What steps could an employee take when discovering that something is wrong on his or 
her working-place?  
 
18 (i) Without the fear of repercussions at work?  
 
The following situation occurs, a public employee suspects that another colleague (or a 
political superior) is engaging in some corrupt activity or is giving special treatment to some 
business/use of the administration at the expense of others. Would he/she report this to some 
newspaper/ responsible authorities such as the judicial system? 
 
19. Is there adequate protection to rely on, against any unjustified sanction, for those who 
make such disclosure in the public interest to the responsible authorities or media? 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND SERVICES 
 
20. What strategy is used in your district in order to enforce the compliance and good 
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conduct of the employees in the public service? Is there any punishment? If so, what? Who 
imposes it? Or, on the contrary, is there a system of rewards as incentives, e.g. reward/bonus 
schemes? 
 
  
21. Can you provide any examples of the measures implemented to enforce good behavior 
of public authorities? 
 
 
22. Does the general public (citizens) "voice complaints" when they acknowledge the 
occurrence of a corrupt act? Does this public opinion have the potential to act as a constraint 
on the authorities. (Is the public pressure present and effective in the enforcement of good 
conduct of public officials?) 
 
23. Is corruption investigated in your region by justice courts, the media or NGO‘s? Are you 
aware of cases where corruption acts by public officials in your region have been trialed and 
prosecuted?  
 
24. Are you aware of any particular corruption monitoring mechanism in your region?  
 
 
Devolutions impact/ changes in region 
25. Have you observed a significant change in the quality of public services since the 
introduction of local government? If so, please specify the level of change: 
 
26. Do you expect Quality of government to change in the next five years (for better or for 
worse)? 
 
27. Please specify the level of improvement of the services provided by the following public 
institutions after the devolution: 
 
 
a. Schools 
 
b. Universities 
 
c. Hospitals 
 
d. Court of law 
 
e. Police 
 
28. What are some positive and negative aspects regarding the public administration during 
the last 10 years in your district?  
 
Regional Autonomy 
 
29. Regarding the autonomy in this particular district, to what extent are the following 
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practices/ elements autonomous from the center?  
 
a. Recruitment of public staff   
 
b. Design of public structure (organization chart) 
 
c. Elaboration of regional laws 
 
d. Control of regional natural resources 
 
e. Incentives to foreign investment  
 
f. Allocation of foreign investment 
 
30. Is there any autonomy in this particular region in the organization of the public 
administration? If so, what particular elements differ? 
 
 
31. To what extent does the regional organization chart (public structure) differ from the 
central government? 
 
32. Do you think that the decentralization of public services helps to stimulate 
entrepreneurship in the region and its counties? Why and how?   
 
 
33. To what extent do the county or municipalities in the region have a tax legislation of their 
own? 
 
34. To what extent does the regional autonomy increase QoG? 
 
35. In regard to budget planning, using what criteria is the budget split from the central 
government? Do the regional distinct district councils have complete or partial autonomy in 
deciding how the local budget is used?  
 
Impartiality when acquiring the different services; health care services, education and 
law enforcement.  
 
36. Which of the following factors, do you think could be important when explaining 
perception of fairness/bias/impartiality in the three welfare services; Health care services, 
Education and Law enforcement in your region?  
 
a) Political influence - ―people with the adequate political connections seem to be able to 
chose the best schools not because of skills but because they have influence…‖ 
 
b) Economic influence 
 (e.g. people with more money seem to be able to chose the best schools not because of skills 
but because they have an economic important influence) 
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c) Cultural differences - people who speak a particular language, who ―are from here‖, or who 
belong to to ―right‖ ethnic group or identity seem to be able to chose the best schools not 
because of skills but because they have influence… 
d) Languages differences  
e) Gender 
f)  Relatives (close family or friend)  
 
NOTE: In regard to the question below there is a choice depending on what region you are in. 
The question with positive connotation is intended for the well performing regions whereas 
the question with negative connotation is for the IP of a under performing region. 
 
37. Can you account for one or more illustrative examples  in which one can see how  
fairness/bias/impartiality/lack of corruption – preferably, but not exclusively, in any of the 
three welfare services pointed out – has prevailed? That is, some example in which you have 
said: yes, things work here.  
  
 E.g. some partial/corrupt decision was about to be taken (i.e. a child from poor 
background not accepted in a school, a hotel about to be built on the coast, a bribe from a 
foreign firm that was offered) but was not (maybe because it went into press, or because other 
official complained, or because the public official did not accept the bribe). 
 
 
Can you account for one or more illustrative examples  in which one can see how 
fairness/bias/impartiality in any of the three welfare services could have been affected 
negatively? That is, some example in which you feel things are not working?  
 
38. How would you compare the perceived impartiality in the three welfare services, health 
care services, education, and law enforcement to other regions in your country?  
 
39. Are you aware of any particular policy/policies that have been implemented in order to 
increase the fairness/bias/impartiality in any of the three welfare services, health care services, 
education and law enforcement? 
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Annex III 
 
Correspondence with Anwar Shah 
 
A case study would be very interesting but would require major efforts in data collection. It 
may be less onerous to do an international cross-section study that controls for macro 
variables that may have some relevance for elite capture e.g. absence of land reforms, 
concentration of  industry ownership, income inequality, incidence of poverty, nature of 
political finance, concentration of media ownership, democratic participation, election turnout 
. ethnic and cultural variables, colonial heritage etc.  
 
Since your research focus is on elite capture, Karachi and Lahore may not be good examples. 
 Instead Multan and Larkana or similar towns where feudals dominate politics may be better 
examples in seeing whether or not 2001 devolution had any impact on political participation , 
service delivery and incidence of corruption.  
 
